Recent works suggest a potentially exploitable effect in US markets, the 'Halloween Indicator'. This suggests that the greater part of changes in equity markets arises over the November-April period, with little change over the summer months, simultaneous with no evident changes in the risk profiles of the two six-month periods. We re-examine this and find contradictory evidence. Over the 1926-2002 period we find rather that the effect demonstrated may well be a reflection of the well-known January anomaly. Our conclusion therefore is that the jury remains out on the existence of a semi-annual seasonality.
Introduction
One of the more startling claims regarding seasonal patterns are made in a recent paper by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) . They claim that they have discovered a simple strategy that will outperform the stock market while, at the same time, halving the risk. In their paper, this strategy works in 36 out the 37 equity markets analysed; it works in large established markets such as the US and in small emerging markets such as Indonesia; it works over the immediate ; it works after full allowance for trading expenses and taxes and it appears to be present over long runs of time. It works especially well in Europe. The excess risk-adjusted profit of their proposed strategy is demonstrated to be not only economically significant but also statistically significant.
The trading strategy is based on the old market adage; 'Sell in May and go away but buy back on St Leger Day', which is one of the mantras of the stock market of uncertain origin.
2 This adage encapsulates the simple trading rule: sell on 1st May but buy back into the market in autumn sometime. Bouman and Jacobsen show that it matters little whether one buys back in September or October, and adapt the rule so that one buys back at Halloween. The resulting rule is then simply to be in cash for half the year (May to October) and in equities for the other half (November to April). The positive returns delivered by stock markets, they contend, tend to be concentrated in the November-April six months of the year, with the other half of the year delivering poor, often negative, returns.
However, the profitability of such a simple strategy would pose a very strong challenge to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This paper attempts to re-examine this trading strategy using stock level data for the US. If the suggested trading strategy is robust, we should observe profitable returns in this data set. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the vast literature on seasonal patterns, outlining inter alia the argument of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) , Section 3 describes the data set, and Section 4 provides results. A brief conclusion emerges in Section 5.
A brief review of studies of monthly seasonality in equity markets
A significant body of literature already exists to suggest that, especially for smaller capitalization stocks, returns vary significantly across the months of the year. January, especially the early part of January, typically commands the highest returns of a year. Early evidence on the tendency of January returns to exceed those of other months comes from Wachtel (1942) , followed by Officer (1975) and Rozeff and Kinney (1976) after a long hiatus. Prior literature shows that higher returns in January usually co-exist with a size effect (Keim, 1983; Roll, 1983) . Recent studies confirm these findings (Agrawal & Tandon, 1994; Dimson, 1988) , and Hawawini and Keim (2000) show that returns in January are so anomalously high relative to other months that, if used as an explanatory variable, better accounts for cross-sectional returns of stocks than the beta of CAPM or some of the data-driven models proposed in recent years.
Besides the January effect, various other month effects have been documented in different countries. We briefly summarize them as follows.
US markets
Most studies (Haugen & Jorion, 1996; Keim, 1983; Reinganum, 1983; Rozeff & Kinney, 1976) show that January has the highest returns in the US market. However, Riepe (1998 Riepe ( , 2001 argue that the excess returns in January may be declining in recent years.
2 St Leger is the oldest classic horse race in the world and takes place every September. It runs since 1776 at Doncaster (so-called since 1778) so the saying could be of a very old vintage. If we were to hazard a guess we would date it from the first half of the 19th century when the St Leger was the most popular of all race meetings and was not without controversy. For instance, in 1819 it was run twice when the favourite was injured in last minute training prompting punters to race to distant betting towns to place their bets at favourable odds (the rerun was later over-ruled by the Jockey Club). Again, in 1829, there was widespread unruly behaviour and several particularly unsavoury characters were 'chased out of town'. The timing of the St Leger Sweepstakes would probably have been very widely known at this time.
UK markets
One of the earlier papers focusing primarily on the UK market is Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) . They find that April returns dominated until January returns took over since the introduction of capital gains taxation in 1965. This finding is confirmed by several subsequent studies (i.e., Arsad & Coutts, 1997; Mills & Coutts, 1995) .
Continental Europe markets
Studies on various exchanges usually show that January witnesses the highest returns of a year (Barone, 1990; Canestrelli & Ziemba, 2000; Donnelly, 1991; Gahan, 1993; Lucey, 1994; van den Berg & Wessels, 1985) . The next highest return months mentioned frequently in the literature are February and April, although the results are not as robust (Donnelly, 1991; Gahan, 1993; Lucey, 1994; McKillop & Hutchinson, 1989) .
Asia-Pacific
Although January is shown to have highest returns during a year for various Asia-Pacific markets, such as Japan (Comolli & Ziemba, 2000; Ziemba, 1991) , Australia (Berges, McConnell, & Schlarbaum, 1984; Brown, Keim, Kelidon, & Marsh, 1983; Officer, 1975) , south-east Asia (Ho, 1990) and Hong-Kong, Korea and Taiwan (Wong, Neoh, Lee, & Thjong, 1990) , other studies have found that the 'January effect' is not very robust in this area (Chan, Khanthavit, & Thomas, 1996; Tong, 1992) . In some countries, February, April, or December have been shown to have the highest returns of a year. More recent research (Hamori, 2001) confirms that monthly seasonality in Japan has declined over the 1990's while Holden, Thompson, and Ruangrit (2005) examine the situation in Thailand, demonstrating continued high January returns.
Other markets
The 'January effect' is not well-documented in other markets. Instead, June and May are shown to have higher returns in Jamaica (Ramcharran, 1997) and Johannesburg stock exchange (Coutts & Sheik, 2000) , respectively. A July effect is found in Kuwait (Al-Saad & Moosa, 2005) and an effect centered on Ramadan (the Muslim holy month) is found for Saudi Arabia by Seyyed, Abraham and Al-Hajji (2005) , while in several Latin American markets (Cabello & Ortiz, 2004) both January and other effects are found. A November peak is found in Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) propose a simple strategy: sell in May, hold cash until (in a slight change to simplify the old rule) the end of October, and then buy back into the equity market. The markets, they contend, deliver poor returns through the summer and autumn months, with all the positive returns coming through in winter and spring. They argue that this evidence is strong for a large sample of developed countries over the 1970-1998 period. They also perform a test of their theory by applying it to a database of historic market returns. They trace returns on 11 markets back as far as records allow and assess how their rule would have worked up to December 1969. They report that it was profitable on a risk-adjusted basis in 10 out of the 11 markets (failing in Australia) and was statistically significant at the 10% level in the UK market since 1694 and at the 5% level in the Japanese market since 1920, the Canadian market since 1933, and the Dutch market since 1950. In relation to the US they claim that
(1) The average monthly return on the MSCI index from 1970-1998 period was 5% greater in the 'winter' period than the summer, with no significant difference in the standard deviation, (2) The Halloween indicator provides significant evidence of market timing, and (3) A trading rule based on the Halloween indicator provides significant advantages over the buy-and-hold strategy.
Although they do not comment on it, they also look at the US market over the 1802-1969 period, but find no evidence of such an effect. It is this finding of temporal instability that has prompted this paper.
Data and methodology
We investigate the 'Halloween Indicator' using the CRSP dataset. There are two reasons why we use the US stock data. First, we contend that American researchers and traders are relatively unfamiliar with the Halloween indicator compared to European researchers. This data set, although having been extremely well-mined, has not been previously investigated for this phenomenon. Use of a novel and reasonably independent data set can overcome the charge of data mining as pointed out by Lakonishok and M\Smidt (1988) and Sullivan, Timmerman, and White (2004) . Hence, if such a market anomaly exists, we should be able to identify it using this US data. Second, CRSP contains data on all US stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX (after July, 1962) and NASDAQ (after December, 1972) . By investigating the 'Halloween Indicator' at the stock level, we will be able to examine the robustness of this anomaly and the extent to which it differs across stock deciles.
We use the monthly CRSP Stock File Capitalization Decile Indices, which include all common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and the Nasdaq National Market with the exclusion of American Depository Receipts. All eligible securities are ranked according to capitalization and then dividend into ten equal portfolios during each rebalancing period from which indices are created. These portfolio indices re-balance each year, according to the security market capitalization at the end of the previous year. The largest securities are placed in portfolio 10 and the smallest in portfolio 1. There are two overall portfolio indices, an equal and a value weighted version, containing all stocks, while the decile indices are all calculated only on a value weighted basis. All returns dividendadjusted. We show in Table 1 the month-by-month returns by deciles. Table 2 presents some summary statistics. A number of points are evident. From analysis of the first two moments, there is some support for the Bauman and Jacobsen contention. Average returns over the winter months exceed those for the summer months in both the Value and Equal weighted CRSP indices, and in all deciles. The magnitude of the excess return declines monotonically as we increase stock size; there is no consistent pattern in the changes in standard deviation, but again, in all cases, the riskiness of the Decile portfolio is lower in winter than in the summer. In all cases, except for Decile 2, the downside risk of the portfolio, as measured by the minimum return, is lower in the winter months than the summer. However, the reverse is generally the case for upside potential. 
Results
where W is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the month is November through April, excluding January, and J is a variable that takes the value 1 if the month is January. R t i is the return for each decile or index. p-value is the marginal significance of the test of coefficient being zero.
Excluding January returns, the case for the existence of a Halloween Indicator is not as clearcut. These analyses are presented in panel B, Table 2 . The broad pattern still holds: winter returns, regardless of stock size, are greater and winter risks lower than summer. In all cases the absolute level of winter returns are greatly reduced from what they are with January returns included, this reduction being much larger at the lower deciles. For example, Decile 1 winter returns fall from 3.3% to 0.86%, and Decile 4 from 1.93% to .99%. On average, measured as a percentage of the January inclusive returns, we note that over the 5 smallest deciles the returns fall by some 55% on average, while the decline for the largest 5 is of the order of 19%, the percentage declines again monotonically declining as we increase the Decile size. While for the most part the standard deviations of the returns with January excluded are lower than with January included, the reverse is the case for the very largest stocks, Decile 10, where the risk profile has actually increased.
This set of findings would be consistent with the Halloween indicator being driven by the January seasonal. To formally test this we conduct a test using the following equation
where W is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the month is November through April, excluding January, and J is a variable that takes the value 1 if the month is January. If the Halloween indicator truly holds at the equity level then we should find that the coefficient on the winter dummy remains significant even in the presence of the January dummy. If, conversely, only the January dummy remains significant then we can conclude that a January effect remains, and thus that the findings of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) may be a reflection of the dataset used. We show the results of this analysis in Table 3 . It is clear that, conditional on January returns, there is, counter to the findings of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) , no persistent statistical significance for the winter dummy, indicating that perhaps there is not a Halloween indicator after all. For neither the Value nor Equal weighted CRSP indices is the coefficient significant; nor does it attain significance in any of the Decile analyses. Contrast this with the January dummy, which remains statistically significant in the Equal weighted index and in the eight smallest Deciles. Over the long term therefore it appears that there may be no Halloween indicator and that the January-small firm effect instead was present in US equities. Table 4 examines the robustness of the Halloween/January effect over sub-periods. There is no evidence that the Halloween indicator has ever been strongly present. Of the 40 Decile coefficients only 11 attain statistical significance. Deciles 1, 2 and 4 never show significance; in the 1926-1945 and 1966-1985 period no Decile is significant. Contrast this with the January coefficient, which is always significant for Deciles 1-4, and was significant for all but the two largest Deciles in the 1966-1985 period. Only in three cases out of 80, Decile 3 1946-1965, and Deciles 5-6 1986-2002 do we find a significant winter coefficient in the presence of a significant January coefficient.
We also examine the impact of the January returns on the Halloween anomaly using a nonparametric test, namely the Kruskal-Wallis test. This test is designed to evaluate the hypothesis that the populations from which the samples are drawn have identical distributions, and it is particularly sensitive to differences in means. It can also be loosely described as testing that the different populations have the same mean. Let R j 2 be the average rank of observations in the jth group (and n j be the number of observations in the jth group. Then with k groups and N observations in total the Kruskal-Wallis H statistic is then H ¼
Þ, which is distributed as a χ 2 distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom. 
where W is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the month is November through April, excluding January, and J is a variable that takes the value 1 if the month is January. R t i is the return for each decile or index. p-value is the marginal significance of the test of coefficient being zero. The regression analysis is carried out for each period as indicated in the first column. 1063
We split the data based on the W coefficient of Eq. (1). So for each period and each Decile, we have two groups (winter and summer) and the number of observations N is equal to 12 times the number of years during that period. We conduct the test on returns both including and excluding January returns. The results are reported in Table 5 . As can be seen while there is generally evidence of a valid split based on the W variable, indicating a Halloween effect, this all but disappears when we exclude January returns from the data. Thus based both on parametric and non-parametric tests we find that January returns drive a significant element of the Halloween effect.
We perform an additional test using re-sampling methodologies (see Diebold & Kilian, 2001 ) and Lucey (2004) for examples of this approach in finance) to investigate whether the p-values we obtained in Table 4 are correct. Re-sampling methodologies are used to investigate the average magnitude of the p-value for the Halloween indicator if it were to be simply the result of chance. If our estimated p-value is lower than the re-sampled p-value, we may then be confident that the result we have found is not because of the particular ordering of the data, and we can feel confident to reject the null hypothesis of no association. If the estimated p-values are greater than the re-sampled p-value, then the estimated p-values may simply arise from chances in data structure and there is only limited evidence of association. As a result, re-sampling methodologies are only meaningful for cases where the Halloween indicator seems to exist, and so we perform re-sampling tests for the 11 cases where the Halloween indicator from Table 4 is significant. In each case, the data are randomly shuffled and re-sampled, 12 observations (monthly returns) are drawn from the entire population of 924, and Eq. (1) is run. We repeat this process 10,000 times. Table 6 shows the results of the re-sampled version of Table 4 alongside the original results. In all cases the original p-values are less than the average re-sampled p-values. Therefore, the resampling measures provide support for the contention that there is only a limited Halloween effect in operation. 
The test is distributed as a χ 2 test, with a null R i = R j , 8i, j.
We also examine the profitability of a strategy based on buy-and-hold versus that on the Halloween indicator. Our strategy is exactly that of Bouman and Jacobsen: receive the return on the market portfolio for the winter months, sell in May and switch to receiving the return on 30-day t-bills, in October return into equities. We assume a 1% roundtrip cost per transaction, which is probably an over-estimate. The results of such a strategy are shown in Table 7 where we compare the average monthly return to each strategy over a variety of periods. There is a significant instability in the relative attractiveness of each strategy. In all cases, the lower risk strategy is that of the Halloween strategy with the standard deviation of monthly returns averaging between a half and a third of that of the buy-and-hold strategy. Over the entire 76 year period the Halloween strategy outperforms in all save Decile 2 and Decile 4. Furthermore, the Halloween strategy appears to become less attractive during recent years; over the 1986-2002 period we find that buy-and-hold outperforms the Halloween strategy in all save Deciles 5 and 8 and over the 1966-2002 period buy-and-hold outperforms in all save Deciles 3-5-8. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) also claim that the Halloween indicator provides a statistically significant market timing indicator, using the non-parametric test of Henriksson and Merton (1981) . This approach involves using the Halloween indicator to predict that the summer will be a bear market, the return on the stock index under investigation being less than the risk-free rate, while the winter period will be a bull market. Although noted (Table A3 ) they do not discuss the fact that the Halloween timing indicator performs worse in the US than in any other large market. We examine the performance of the Halloween indicator over the 1926-2002 period as an indicator of market conditions. Shown in Table 8 are the results, the p-values on the market timing variable being estimated by the Breen, Glosten and Jagannathan (1989) approach. While for the smaller stock deciles there is some evidence of market timing ability (mirroring the finding in Bouman and Jacobsen for country indices) as the stock size increases the ability of the Halloween indicator to predict correctly the market situation decreases. Given the well-known concentration of the January effect in smaller capitalization stocks this is congruent with the January effect driving a large part of the Halloween indicator. 
Conclusion
Our analysis of the US market, using CRSP data, indicates that the Halloween indicator of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) may well not exist. The evidence over the long term and across deciles is that the Halloween indicator, where it does appear, may be a reflection of the January effect, itself generally declining both in significance and in absolute terms. Contrary to the results of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) , a trading strategy based on the purported indicator is not obviously superior to a buy-and-hold strategy, especially over the latter part of the 20th century. Nor does the indicator have good predictive power of the market direction, especially for larger stocks. Overall, therefore we conclude that the evidence for the Halloween indicator is weak, at best, in the US context.
A number of potential explanations for the dichotomy between our results and Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) remain. However, we contend that these are unlikely in themselves to close this gap. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) use MSCI indices, which are free-float adjusted indices. We use the CRSP data, which are total float. MSCI stockholdings, for the most part, defines government and strategic financial institutional shareholdings as non-investible. However, neither of these are significant in the US data, and thus, the difference in definition is unlikely to have significance in the US context. Nor can the changing risk premium be a cause -over the 1970-1998 period the risk premium (defined as the average excess return of an index over the average t-bill) was lower than average, thus if anything relatively penalising the Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) time period. Hence, we conclude that the Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) findings of a significant Halloween indicator are most probably driven by January returns and may not be present in US equities in the long term.
